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The Fifth Amendment and the Guilty
Plea: An Incompatible Association
By VIvIAN DEBORAH WILSON*

Introduction
In the year 1590, John Udall, a Puritan minister who preached
against Her Majesty's church and wrote bitter, anticlerical lampoons,
was on trial for libeling Queen Elizabeth I. The penalty was the gallows. He stood in the dock at Croyden Assize, badgered by the Prosecutor and the Judge.
Accused the Judge:
What say you? Did you make the Book, Udall, yea or no! What
say you to it, will you be sworn? Will you take your oath that you
made it or not? We will offer you that favour which never any indicted of Felony had before; take your oath, and swear you did it
not, and it shall suffice.
Udall refused to confess.
I will go further with you; [said the Judge.] Will you but say upon
your honesty that you made it not, and you shall see what shall be
said unto you?
Ultimately defeated, the Judge addressed the Jury:
You of the Jury consider this. This argueth, that if he were not
guilty, he would clear himself, and consider well of it.
And to Udall:
Confess it and submit yourself to the Queen's mercy, before the Jury
find you guilty.'
The jury found Udall guilty2 and, shortly thereafter while awaiting
3
hanging, he died in prison.
* B.A. Hunter College, New York City; M.S., Columbia University; J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Associate Professor of Law, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law. The author was a public defender in Alameda
County, California, for three years before joining the Hastings faculty.
1. Trial of Mr. John Udall, 32 Eliz. 1590, reprinted in 1 STATE TIALs 1271, 1282
(1590).
2. Id at 1297-1306.
3. Id at 1315.
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Such was the tortured posture of the accused before the English
courts of the Star Chamber and the High Commission. 4 The Inquisito-

rial system of justice, emphasizing the pursuit and acquisition of some
reasonable approximation of the truth, was openly disposed to view the

accused as a member, however unwilling, of the prosecutorial team.
Not only was he prodded into a prompt response 5 to inquiry, but he
6
was, indeed, expected to assume the role of his own accuser.
To a society which mandates that "[n]o person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,"' 7 the above
exchange should appear to be the primitive practice of an undeveloped
civilization. In our proclaimed zeal to safeguard the rights of criminal
defendants, we have sanctioned their silence. 8 Our quest for justice

presumably does not allow deviation from the somewhat pious declaration that "the law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the deluded
instrument of his own conviction." 9
With that imperative, consistency requires that we do homage to

the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the station
house unless we are prepared implicitly to abandon it in the court
house. It has long been obvious that the defendant's election to remain

silent at trial would be theoretically meaningless and strategically ludicrous if the police officer, having encouraged or coerced the accused,
through whatever means, into a confession could then mount the wit-

ness stand and testify to its incriminating contents. Miranda v.
Arizona'0 reiterated: "[AIll the careful safeguards erected around the
4. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 164-70 (1968).
5. See generally E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 3 (1955).
6. See L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 70 (1968). It is not necessarily
inappropriate to use the suspect as a source of information about his offense. "Justie...
would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry," remarked Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 301 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). "[W]hile the
other privileges accord with notions of decent conduct generally accepted in life outside the
courtroom, the privilege against self-incrimination defies them. Every hour of the day people are being asked to explain their conduct to parents, employers and teachers. Those who
are questioned consider themselves to be morally bound to respond, and the questioners
believe it proper to take action if they do not." Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow:
The Case of ConstitutionalChange, 37 U. CrN. L. REv. 671, 680 (1968).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Professor Schlesinger charges that we "underemphasize the principal objective of
the criminal process: the ascertainment of truth." Schlesinger, Comparative CriminalProcedure: A Pleafor Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 361, 384 (1977). He
suggests that we should "revise those of our rules which directly discourage the accused from
testifying and encourage him to remain silent." Id at 383.
9. Gilham's Case, 2 Moody 194, 195, citedin Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 547
(1897).
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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giving of testimony... would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling evidence of guilt, a confession, would
have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the
police.""
Although the proposition remains sound, it is now only partially
accomplished. An examination of recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court 12 demonstrates that fifth amendment protections no
longer flourish in the station house, as Miranda had sanguinely promised. Despite the alarm evoked by these recent developments, they do
not, in reality, represent a major defeat for liberty. The gloomiest prediction--that the diminishing possibility of successfully challenging a
confession would further inflate the rate of guilty pleas-is the sheerest
13
speculation.
All in all, the erosion of Miranda appears to be a matter of indifference. The truly serious issue requires reversing the syntax and inquiring, what is the value of scrupulous respect for the accused's right
to silence during custodial interrogation if the fifth amendment privilege is ultimately sacrificed, and the sacrifice sanctified, by formal proceedings in the courtroom? It is the point of this Article that the
defendant in a criminal case, having been induced by various methods,
some more salubrious than others,' 4 (and having most certainly been
bargained) to enter a guilty plea, has, by that action, subjected himself
to compelled self-accusation. For whatever else it may have accomplished,15 the custom of the bargained guilty plea has thoroughly, and
11. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quotedin Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
12. Oregon v. Mathiasen, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
13. No matter how the Supreme Court rules, it is perfectly possible for police officers to
obtain confessions by using techniques that fall within permissible boundaries. A study conducted in New Haven, Connecticut, after the Supreme Court decision in Mirandaconcluded
that literal compliance with the admonition did not "alleviate the pressure" to confess. Interrogationsin New Haven: The Impact ofMiranda,76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1523 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Yale Project].
14. E.g., in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 762 (1970), Dash's petition alleged
that "his guilty plea was the illegal product of a coerced confession and of the trial judge's
threat to impose a 60-year sentence if he was convicted after a plea of not guilty. . . . [HMe
had been beaten, refused counsel, and threatened with false charges [and] his court-appointed attorney had advised pleading guilty since Dash did not 'stand a chance due to the
alleged confession signed' by him." Richardson alleged he pleaded guilty because his assigned attorney advised "this was not the proper time to bring up the confession" and that
he could later raise the issue of how the "confession had been beaten out" of him by writ of
habeas corpus. Id at 763.
15. "For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading
guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious-his exposare is reduced, the correc-
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with an astonishing absence of outrage, destroyed the fifth amendment
privilege in the courtroom.
As one defendant protested,
I pleaded guilty. . . because they said there is too much evidence,
but I ain't shot no man, but I take the fault for the other man. . . . I
just pleaded guilty because they said if I didn't they would gas me for
it. . . . I'm still pleading guilty. . . that you all got me to plead
guilty. . . . You
told me to plead guilty... . I'm not guilty but I
16
plead guilty.
Denials, excuses and justifications are unavailing.17 Whether or
not our criminal justice bureaucracy can survive without plea bargaining is an issue of insubstantial significance compared with the central
question: Can our need for justice survive the costliness of our hypocrisy, or must cynicism and corruption inevitably result? In this writer's
view, there are no complex solutions, only simple ones.' 8 Our only appropriate stance is to relinquish our unwillingness to perceive what has
in fact occurred, and to acknowledge that our reverence for the
"mighty" privilege, and perhaps for the adversary system, has waned.
There is profit in the recognition itself. Once we discover that we have
choices, we can engage in serious, direct efforts to revive the fifth
amendment or, in the alternative, we can choose to memorialize its demise and then to manage-as best, or at least, as honestly-as we can.
The Impact of Miranda
As a 'noble principle often transcends its origins,' the privilege
has come rightfully to be recognized ...as an individual's substantive right, a 'right to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy. ' 9
So announced the court in Miranda v. Arizona,20 characterizing the
privilege against self-incrimination as "fundamental to our system of
tional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated.
For the State there are also advantages-the more promptly imposed punishment after an
Brady v.
admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment ....
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
16. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 n.2 (1970).
17. The Court in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970), justified accepting
Alford's plea of guilty by finding a "strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by the
State and Alford's clearly expressed desire to enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence." See note 81 infra.
18. Either there are simple solutions or there are no solutions at all. In the latter event,
the problem is properly characterized as a dilemma.
19. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court in Miranda, outraged by its discovery of official
use of third-degree tactics, intended to provide a procedure for counteracting the coercive
impact of custodial interrogation.
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constitutional rule '21 and "the essential mainstay of our adversary system." 22 These pronouncements prompted Justice Harlan to deplore the
new rule as "voluntariness with a vengeance" 23 and to prophecy doom

in the form of the end of all confessions, if not the conclusion to effective law enforcement. Viewing the lawyer as a menace, Harlan warned
that his presence in the station house would function as an "obstacle to

truthfmding." 24 Although disasters are commonplace, predictions of
disaster rarely materialize. Recitation of the Miranda admonition 25 in
the station house does not appear to affect the number of confessions
elicited by police officers. The results of a study26 conducted during

the summer of 1966 in New Haven, Connecticut, concluded that there
was "no evidence indicating that the warnings... caused many sus-

pects to refuse to talk or to ask for counsel." 27
One wonders why the obvious affects of Miranda had not been
foreseen by a court so obsessively troubled by police interrogation tactics. 28 The Mirandawarning, 2 9 sturdy though it may have appeared at

the time to the learned justices, was simply no match for law enforcement machinery. The admonition became at best a pro forma litany,
recited to convey a message having little to do with the literal definition
of the passage. Delivered to an accused more likely than not alone,
friendless, and detained on the interrogator's territory by an officer
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id at 468.
Id at 460.
Id at 505 (Harlan, ., dissenting).
Id at 514 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The warning is set out in full at note 29 infra.
Yale Project, supra note 13.

27. Id at 1523.
28. The Court described police tactics as follows: "To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the manuals instruct the police to display an air of confidence in the
suspect's guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming
certain details. The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact. The interrogator should
direct his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than court
failure by asking the subject whether he did it. Like other men, perhaps the subject has had
a bad family life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited
desire for women. The officers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or on society. These tactics are designed to put the subject
in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to
know already-that he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and discouraged." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450 (1966).
29. "Before I can ask you any questions, I must inform you of your rights. You have
the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law. You
have the right to have an attorney present during this interrogation. If you cannot afford an
attorney, one will be appointed for you." Miranda warnings reassure the suspect that the
interview is a voluntary search for truth and lull him toward self-persuasion. See generally
Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1968).
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who may be bored and disinterested, or, alternatively, sympathetic and
outraged, but who, in any case, is only doing his job,30 the warning is
effective only to mark the seriousness of the moment, to signify the
suspect's new status as the accused, and, perhaps, to imply a threat of
dire and ineluctable consequences. The recitation fails to function as a
protective safeguard against the coercive atmosphere of the station
house and is transformed, instead, into one of the coercive incidents
inherent in custody, if not a technique of coercion itself. As police
manuals advise,
[o]ur legal system is concerned with the overborne will of a person
who makes admissions against self-interest. Systematic persuasion,
which is conducted in an amiable and humane atmosphere by the
interviewer, should in no way conflict with our legal system....
is actually more of an
[G]uaranteeing ... the rights of the individual
3
aid to the investigator than a hindrance. '
It is not overly imaginative to suggest that the accused may evaluate the
32
alternative of silence as an unavailing, if not impossible, posture.
[T]he suspect.. . should be continuously impressed with his crimes
and the need for him to cleanse his soul, mind, and body, and to
show contrition immediately ....
Point out the impossibility of ever completely removing the
gnawing distress arising from the suspect's sense of guilt for his past
30. "[T]he agents sought to minimize the formality of the situation. They endeavored
to create the atmosphere of a normal human encounter. They seemed anxious to talk in
personal terms and to avoid being perceived as abstract interrogators. They initiated small
talk about their job and their families and encouraged the suspects to respond in kind. They
emphasized that they were only doing their job, did not have any personal feelings against
the suspect, and wished they were talking to him in other circumstances. Occasionally the
agents overstepped the bounds of strict propriety and went so far as to suggest that they were
talking 'off the record'. . . ." Faculty Note, A Postscript to the MirandaProject Interrogation of Draft Protestors,77 YALE L.J. 300, 315-16 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Yale Project
Postscriot].
31.

R. ROYAL & S. SCHUTr, THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGA-

TION 24-25 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL & SCHutrr].
32. During the interrogation of draft protestors by the FBI in New Haven, many suspects were interrogated before they were admonished, and forms of waiver were presented
as part of the routine, thus conveying the expectation that waiver was the natural consequence of warning. Those who asserted the right to silence were repeatedly required to
confum that choice and, nonetheless, complied in answering seemingly innocuous background questions.
"Two suspects who refused to answer were told gravely: 'Of course, you realize we will
have to report that you refused to answer questions.'.. . When one suspect requested...
time to consult a lawyer, he received the irritated reply, 'There is the matter of a federal
crime here, you know-we can't draw this thing out indefinitely.' An agent solemnly warned
an ordained minister. 'You understand that people in your position are not immune from
the consequences of your action.'. . . A suspect who steadfastly refused to answer the question of whether he had his draft card was told, 'This doesn't concern your right of silence--we just want to see your card." Yale Project Postscript,supra note 30, at 308-09.
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overt acts if he does not admit his mistakes and tell the truth. Remind him that he must "look at himself in the mirror" each morning
and live with himself the rest of his days, he will have to rid himself
of self-punishment, his own "hell." Tell the suspect that he will have
the feelings of a hunted animal if he does not remove the matter from
33
his mental processes. Point out the details of his guilty appearance.

Of course, it cannot possibly be the interrogator's purpose to en-

courage the accused in the assertion of his right to silence, nor to assure
that any forthcoming waiver truly fulfills the requirement that it be
free, knowing, understanding and voluntary 4 It is, rather, the interrogator's objective to elicit statements. 35 Whether these statements are
viewed by the suspect as exculpatory or inculpatory is a matter of total
indifference to the interrogator for what is meant to be an exculpatory
statement often implicates. 36 Waiver, then, is a necessary technicality
to be secured in any manner that is reasonably nonviolent, secured perfunctorily, solicitously, suggestively:
'I read you your warnings. Now sign here."
"What am I signing?"
'That I read you the warnings."
The accused signs.
"All right, now, where were you... ?-37
33. ROYAL & ScHtTT, supra note 31, at 126.
34. "To ask a detective... to act both as interrogator and counsel for the defense is to
require a capacity for schizophrenia as a qualification for the job." Yale Project Postscr#pt,
supra note 30, at 309-10.
35. An analogy may be made to the stop and search cases. When police officers stop a
car and request consent to search, they do not expect the search to produce nothing. On the
contrary, the expectation is that incriminating evidence will be discovered. The officer naturally will anticipate the suspect's refusal to allow the search and, therefore, will make his
request in some fashion that will induce consent. As Professor Spritzer points out, the holding in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231 (1973), is instructive. There the Court
stated that it would be "thoroughly impractical" to advise the suspect of the right to refuse
consent to search his automobile. As Professor Spritzer points out, however, the holding has
the curious result of legitimizing all searches unless the suspect protested, "was abused or is
feebleminded." Spritzer, CriminalWaiver, ProceduralDefault and the Burger Court, 126 U.
PA. L. REv. 473, 478-79 (1978).
36. When Danny Escobedo, confronted with Di Gerlando, said, "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," he thought he was exonerated himself. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
483 (1964). When Tucker gave the police another's name, he thought he was offering an
alibi. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 436 (1974).
37. The interrogator typically announces, "Now, I am going to warn you of your
rights," implying that this is a burdensome interruption in the conversation that has already
commenced. Once that duty is accomplished, the interrogator follows with, "Now you have
been warned of your rights .... [W]ould you like to tell me what happened?" Yale
Project,supra note 13, at 1552.
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The Erosion of Miranda The Supreme Court of the United States, in what may be viewed
as an exercise in pointlessness, has chosen to undercut Arizona v.
Miranda38 and the decision has been virtually emasculated. In Oregon
v. Mathiason,39 the Court abandoned the requirement that warnings

must be given when "an individual [is in] custody" or "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 40 Mathiason
ruled that warnings need not be given unless "there has been such a
restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' ",41
In Michigan v. Mosley,42 the Court approved a resumption of
questioning, after Mosley had initially asserted his right to silence, with
an assertion that Bert Mosley's right to cut off questioning had been
"fully respected," 43 and the statements he made were thus admissible at
his trial. Although it is true that interrogation did not resume until
Mosley was admonished for a second time, it is by no means certain
that the Miranda imperative was satisfied. Does a fresh warning protect the freedom to choose to respond, or is the opposite true-that re38. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
40. Id at 494. Carl Mathiason, the defendant, appeared at the state patrol office in
Pendleton, Oregon, at the request of an officer for an interview regarding a burglary of
which Mathiason, a parolee, was suspected. "'The door [to the office] was closed. The two
sat across a desk. The police radio in another room could be heard. The officer told defendant he wanted to talk to him about a burglary and that his truthfulness would possibly be
considered by the district attorney or judge. The officer further advised that the police believed defendant was involved in the burglary and [falsely stated that] defendant's fingerprints were found at the scene. The defendant sat for a few minutes and then said he had
taken the property. This occurred within five minutes after the defendant had come to the
office. The officer then advised defendant of his Miranda rights and took a taped confession. At the end of the taped conversation the officer told defendant he was not arresting
him at [that] time; he was released to go about his job and return to his family. The officer
said he was referring the case to the district attorney for him to determine whether criminal
charges would be brought."' Id at 493-94 (quoting from Supreme Court of Oregon opinion, 275 Or. 1, 3-4, 549 P.2d 673, 674 (1976)). The Burger Court disagreed with the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Oregon that the interrogation took place in a "coercive
environment." Id at 495.
41. Id at 495.
42. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
43. Mosley, having been advised of his Miranda rights in Detroit police headquarters,
declined to talk about several robberies of which he was suspected. Some hours later at
another location in the same building, a different detective advised Mosley of his Miranda
rights and questioned him about another crime, a murder. This time he cooperated, implicating himself. Id at 97-98. Mr. Justice Stewart, delivering the opinion of the Court, acknowledged that "the critical safeguard.. . is a person's 'right to cut off questioning'" and
concluded that Mosley had been amply protected, his right to cut off questioning fully
respected. Id at 103-04.
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peated admonitions in themselves constitute a coercive event? As
Justice Brennan reminded the Court, "[R]enewed questioning itself is

part of the process which invariably operates to overcome the will of a
suspect.""4
In Michigan v. Tucker,45 Justice Relmquist, while characterizing
the fifth amendment privilege as" 'one of the great landmarks in man's
struggle to make himself civilized,' "46 promptly trivialized Miranda,
finding that the accused had not been deprived of his fifth amendment
right but of something more readily relinquished. 4 7 The Court held

that the police, in disregarding Miranda, had committed nothing more
than "a mere departure from prophylactic standards rather than a violation of constitutional rights," 48 an action the Court found altogether
excusable. "[The law] cannot realistically require that policemen investigating serious crime make no errors whatsoever. The pressures of law
enforcement and the vagaries of human nature would make such an
expectation unrealistic. . .. ,,49 Although the Court deplores the use
of torture and third-degree tactics, 50 it comes close to applauding the

successful application of studiously nonphysical, custodial coercion as
a technique to extract statements from criminal defendants. Psychological force that exploits a suspect's sense of guilts ' is an essential element
44. Id at 114 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
46. Id at 439.
47. Id at 444-45.
48. Id at 446.
49. Id In giving Tucker his Miranda warnings, the police failed to inform him that
counsel would be appointed if he could not afford retained counsel. Tucker, electing to talk,
gave the name of an alibi witness who subsequently made a damaging statement. The Court
concluded that the witness' testimony need not have been excluded in Tucker's criminal
trial. Whether or not the result in Tucker is correct, the analysis is flimsy because the Court
failed to perceive, much less explore, the connection between Tucker's statements which had
been deemed inadmissible and the derivative character of the witness' testomony.
50. Id at 448. Cases which involve the self-incrimination clause, by definition, must
involve an element of coercion, since the clause provides only that a person shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself. Cases involving statements often depict severe
pressures which may override a particular suspect's insistence on innocence. Fact situations
range from classical third-degree torture, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), to prolonged isolation from family or friends in a hostile setting, Galleos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49
(1962), to a simple desire on the part of a physically or mentally exhausted suspect to have a
seemingly endless interrogation end, Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). Each of these
situations might be sufficient to cause a defendant to accuse himself falsely.
51. "The insecurity translated to guilt feelings normal to the personality leads to an
inescapable need for expiation or atonement on the part of most people. Various theologies
have made capital use of this need for expiation for thousands of years. The offer of salvation, with its guaranteed release from anxiety feelings for the doer of good deeds, reinforces
the theological position. The theological introduction, of the all-inclusive embodiment
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in law enforcement technology. The results are rationalized as beneficial to a society that, although protesting otherwise, presumes the guilt
of the criminally accused, as well as the inviolable intransigence of innocence,5 2 the redemptive powers of confession and punishment, and

the overriding virtue of " 'society's interest in effective prosecution of
criminals.' "53

The Guilty Plea
However adverse the ultimate outcome must have appeared to
Mosley,54 Mathiason,5 5 and Tucker,5 6 they were, nonetheless, in a pos-

ture of peculiar advantage compared to the average criminal defendant. They experienced a rare occasion: they went to trial and were,
57
consequently, able to challenge the claimed constitutional defect.

Most criminal defendants never go to trial5" but appear, briefly and
ritually, in the courtroom, to witness the accusatory proceedings concluded with a conviction by plea.5 9 For that reason, the question of the
called sin, or evil, and the hell and torment awaiting those who perpetrate iniquitous acts or
sins, further reinforces the normal insecurity and subsequent feelings in men. In turn, this
strengthens the release from anxiety when achieving expiation." ROYAL & SCHUTr, supra
note 31, at 136.
52. Innocent suspects have, indeed, been known to confess. "Interrogation procedures
may even give rise to a false confession. The most recent conspicuous example occurred in
New York, in 1964, when a Negro of limited intelligence confessed to two brutal murders
and a rape which he had not committed. When this was discovered, the prosecutor was
reported as saying: 'Call it what you want-brain-washing, hypnosis, fright. They made him
give an untrue confession. The only thing I don't believe is that Whitmore was beaten!"'
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 n.24 (1966) (quoting N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1965, at 1,
col. 5).
53. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-51 (1974) (quoting Jenkins v. Delaware, 395
U.S. 213, 221 (1969)). This position is totally consistent with the justifications offered for
plea bargaining.
54. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
55. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
56. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
57. A plea of guilty based on a coerced confession has been said to "waive" the right to
challenge the antecedent constitutional defect. See notes 91-126 & accompanying text infra.
Waiver is defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
58. "Roughly 90 percent of all criminal convictions are by plea of guilty." D. NEwMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WrrIHouT TRIAL 3
(1966) [hereinafter cited as NEWMAN].
59. One of the earliest appellate cases dealing with plea bargaining is Swang v. State,
42 Tenn. (2 Cald.) 212 (1865). The defendant was charged with 10 counts of gambling. An
agreement was made by the prosecutor in which defendant pled guilty of two charges and
was fined $15 on one count and $10 on another, and the prosecutor dismissed the other eight
charges. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated that this "statement of fact [was] unprecedented in the judicial history of the state," and ordered a new trial on a plea of not guilty.
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coerced confession,6 which may well have prompted the plea, is never
61
raised, much less resolved, and is forever foreclosed.
The ordinary course of events commences on the day of arraignment with the reading of the charges against the defendant. "Not
62
guilty, your honor," is the response in virtually 100% of the cases.
Although no one seriously expects the matter to withstand the harsh
scrutiny of a criminal trial,63 pretense requires setting the matter for
trial. The date of settlement conference is simultaneously calendared,
presaging the event's conclusion with a negotiated guilty plea that,
whatever its source, will finally be characterized as free, willing, and
voluntary. Before that moment arrives, prosecutor and defense counsel
routinely negotiate with the objective of relieving both parties of the
burden of conducting a trial by making entry of a guilty plea palatable
to the accused. Discussions are concerned with reducing charges,64 dismissing charges, and sentencing possibilities. 65 Commonly a bargain
Id at 214. The court said, "By the constitution of the State, the accused, in all cases, has a
right to a 'speedy public trial. . ' and this right cannot be defeated by any deceit or device
whatever." Id at 213-14. Although this may have been the posture of the courts in 1865,
plea bargaining nevertheless became an increasingly acceptable process, given the final
grace and acceptance by the Supreme Court in Santobeilo v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260
(1971).
60. Other issues that can be foreclosed by a plea of guilty entered by a represented
defendant are claims of fourth amendment violations, indictments issued by an unconstitutionally constituted jury, and prosecution based on an unconstitutional statute. Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 317 (1879). But see Henderson
v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (guilty plea of defendant who has not been informed of
elements of offense is involuntary and judgment of conviction violates due process).
61. "Foreclosure" rather than "waiver" is the appropriate term. Professor Peter Westen uses the language of forfeiture. See note 114 infra.
62. "'he scheduling of a trial is generally nothing more than an elaborate charade. A
date is chosen... to try the case. . . as if everyone expected that there would actually be a
trial." L. WENREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 717 (1977). "As the lawyers and the judge...
know, there probably will not [be a trial, but] [t]he defendant's decision to plead guilty is
treated as if it were a surprise ....

."

Id at 73.

63. "By the time the trial date approaches, the defendant understands that a trial is not
to be expected." Id at 77. The perilousness of trial is not to be minimized; given the character of the defendant and the credibility of the usual defense witnesses, conviction may be
reasonably certain.
64. Overcharging is not uncommon. An assistant prosecutor whose job is to file the
original charge explained: "The other day the bargaining prosecutor came in and told us:
'For God's sakes, give me something to work with over there. Don't reduce these cases over

here; let me do it over there or many of these guys will be tried on a misdemeanor.' What he
was referring to is, if we had graded a case at the lowest charge in the class of offenses in
which it logically belonged, a defense attorney could conceivably get this man to plead to
even a lower crime, a misdemeanor, for example. We will limit to the highest possible
charge because we expect a reduction in court for a plea.' NEWMAN, supra note 58, at 81.
65. Plea bargaining has received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court of the United

States: "The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the
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will be struck.
The broken down bargain may bear no relation at all to the specific
facts of the case, the correctional needs of the defendant, or the social
interest in vigorous prosecution. Improper pressures may be brought
to bear on defendants and some prosecutors habitually overcharge to
and in the expectation of a fixed
improve their bargaining position
66
reduction during negotiation.

The accused, conveniently ensconced in custody67 at some distance
from the scene of these encounters is, of course, excluded from the fateful decision until the penultimate moment when the plea is extracted
from him. "It is entirely possible that, in the hopelessness and loneliness of jail. . . a prisoner may discuss a bargain. . . even if he is not
guilty of the offense. '' 68 Whether or not he is fully and effectively represented, that is, whether or not counsel engages in a thorough investigation of the foundation of the case against the client, its strengths and
weaknesses, the exploration of constitutional challenges and the possibility of legal defenses, will depend not only on counsel's training, experience and conscientiousness, but seriousness of purpose, degree of
69
cynicism, and resistance to this preferred mode of criminal justice.
The abrogation of counsel's traditional functions has, indeed, been
viewed not as a regretted defect of plea bargaining but, instead, as one
of its achievements.
accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge
were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to
multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities. Disposition of charges
after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part
for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it
avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for
those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons
who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative
prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned." Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971). Even Justice Douglas accepted plea bargains as "important in the
administration ofjustice" because they "serve an important role in the disposition of today's
heavy calendar." Id at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring).
66. Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 ANNALS 70, 71-72 (1967).
67. Nationwide, "[a]pproximately 20 percent of all defendants charged with felonies or
the more serious misdemeanors are unable to secure their pretrial release and are confined."
P. WicE, BAIL AND ITS REFORM 22 (1973). In 1971 the percentage of felony defendants
detained through disposition was 49% in Oakland and 44% in San Francisco. W. THOMAS,
BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 38 (1976).

68. Hamilton v. California, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 383 P.2d 412, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 921, 922 (1967) (Fortas, Douglas and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
69. "Compared to the typically long, costly, and complex trial, the guilty plea is a
model of efficiency, assuring conviction of defendants at small cost to all involved." NEwMAN, supra note 58, at 4.
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Not only does the guilty plea avoid the time, expense, and work of

proving guilt at trial, but, most of all, complex corollary issues such
as the admissibility of evidence or the propriety of police investigation and arrest practices are largely avoided ... . The police...
may avoid being challenged by the defense
on their grounds for ar70
rest or their apprehension procedures.

Aside from its grossest aberration, the "cop out" bar,7 ' plea bargaining appears to encourage somewhat less than unreserved represen-

tation of defendants. For one thing, there are trade-offs. Defense
counsel, concerned for their "credibility" with judges and prosecutors
are, perhaps unwittingly, influenced to sacrifice one client for the sake
of another who appears more worthy. The fate of any criminal defendant may be less a function of that individual's history, crime, and future
than the outcome of an unacknowledged rivalry. The overt bargain of

a plea of guilty to a lesser offense in return for a sentence reduction
may conceal an underlying, if unspoken and even unrecognized, agreement that probation will be granted to the second offender whose offense is nonviolent, provided that the parolee charged with three firstdegree burglaries, and with a prior robbery on his record, will not de-

72
mand a jury trial.
A second problem is the technique euphemistically called "client
control." Surely the defense lawyer does not exist who has not winced
at a judge's criticism that she lacks client control, because her client
elects to stand trial. Although it is commonly presumed that juries will
resolve a conflict in facts against the criminally accused, it is less readily perceived that defense attorneys regard criminal defendants with
wary skepticism. Although such an attitude may reflect a healthy objectivity, it assumes a different texture when its intention is to secure a
public, recorded admission of guilt. "They're usually guilty of something or other to some degree or another," announced one counsel for

70. Id at 95-96.
71. "Every city has its share of... 'professional writ-runners and pleaders'-lawyers
who virtually never try a case." Alschuler, The Deense Attorney's Role in PleaBargaining,
84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1182 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Alschuler]. "[One] attorney... sometimes entered as many as 25 guilty pleas in a single day.... ." Id at 1184.
72. "The crudest and most obvious form of favoritism for certain clients might be...
the trade-out, in which a defender agrees to a guilty plea or a severe sentence for one client
in exchange for a dismissal of charges or a lenient sentence for another .... 'A lawyer who
represents multiple defendants is thus under strong pressure to sacrifice one of his clients for
the benefit of the group."' Alschuler, supra note 71, at 1210-11. Where a case involves
more than one defendant, prosecutors will ordinarily refuse to bargain unless a "package
deal" can be arranged. Unless each defendant is represented by separate counsel, the possibilities for treachery are almost unavoidable. See United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574
(4th Cir. 1974).
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the defense to a classroom of students in justifying his reputation as a
negotiator, while unwittingly revealing his failure to perceive that, in
this regard, "they" are no different from "we." Defense attorneys can

be prodigiously dogged in their efforts to dissuade clients from going to
trial. To that end, many "are more interested in the strengths of the
prosecution's case than its weaknesses. '73 Protests of innocence are,
74
generally, unavailing:
"I didn't do it."
"You were only three blocks from Vincent's store when they caught
you."
"They didn't find anything on me."
"What about the nylon stockings you were hiding in the bushes?"
"Was I supposed to be wearing that? How could Vincent identify
me, if I was wearing that?"
"Who do you think the jury will believe? You or Vincent?"
"Whose side are you on?"
"If you go to trial the judge will give you the maximum."
"You can
expect consecutive sentences if you go down on all
' 75
CoUntS.

Although it may well be true that most defendants are guilty of

something that society may view as punishable, that probability does
not confront the third problem: the defendant who will not succumb to
the lawyer's entreaties but persists in protesting innocence. Lawyers
who enter guilty pleas for reluctant clients justify the action on grounds
of promise and threat: the prosecution's offer is too good to reject; the

chance of more severe punishment for a finding of guilt after trial is too
real to risk.76 Even lawyers who purport to honor claims of innocence
can be coercive. Professor Alschuler reports the remark of a Chicago
attorney who, addressing the problem of the client who insisted that the
damaging evidence had been planted by the police, said, "I would sim73. Alschuler, supra note 71, at 1228.
74. This exchange is a composite of innumerable dialogues this writer overheard (and
perhaps engaged in) during three years as a Public Defender in Alameda County, California. Commonly defense counsel assumes a stance of entreaty while the accused is resistant.
The mental attitudes are reflected in their physical posture. On plea bargaining day in Oakland Superior Court four chairs are placed outside the holding cell. Two lawyers, seated
facing their clients, can be observed leaning intently forward, earnestly pleading their cases,
while the defendants lean resistantly away.
75. It is not uncommon for judges to penalize defendants for going to trial. Often they
will justify imposing an enhanced penalty on the grounds that the defendant perjured himself on the witness stand.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 681 (N.D. IlM. 1960), where the
judge in denying a request for probation actually stated for the record that "once a defendant stands trial ... [an] element of grace is removed from the consideration of the Court in
the imposition of sentence."
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ply question the defendant until he told me the truth." 77
It is not this writer's intention to trivialize defense counsel's predicament, 78 and surely not to suggest that the problem is properly solved
by lawyers who, viewing it as a matter of conscience, refuse to enter a
guilty plea for the client who protests innocence but wants the deal.
High-minded though this may appear, one detects a tinge of self-indulgence.7 9 It is, however, not inappropriate to inquire whose conscience-lawyer's or client's-should determine whether the accused
enter a plea of guilty for a year in the county jail or challenge the prosecutor with the accompanying risk of a life-top, indeterminate sentence
in the state penitentiary. Despite the holding in North Carolina v.
AlfordO that a plea may be sustained when it has a factual basis, 8 ' it is
nonetheless appropriate to question the proper disposition of the putatively innocent defendant. A factual basis exists for any charge.
82
Should the police report prove unconvincing, a presentence report

can be utilized to provide comfort for the judge whose sense of the
defendant's guilt is uncertain.
Although promoters of plea bargaining ignore its emphasis on calendar congestion and processing people through the system, there is,
nevertheless, much to be said for a system of negotiated settlement
77. Alschuler, supra note 71, at 1287 n.294.
78. Defense counsel who coerces the client into a plea loses the client's respect. Defense counsel who fails to coerce the client into a plea loses the judge's trust.
79. This writer, at the outset of her first felony trial, for a burglary, was confronted by a
client who protested innocence but wanted the deal: plead guilty to receiving stolen property
for a year in the county jail. But the idea offended her, "I cannot allow you to plead guilty
to something you didn't do," she said haughtily. The judge denied the client's motion to
dismiss counsel and then the client proceeded to trial, having been coerced by counsel to risk
five years to life in the State Penitentiary under California's Indeterminate Sentence Law. It
must be said that her efforts resulted in her client's acquittal and that week-long trial tempered her intransigent commitment to the truth.
The most common reason for counsel's refusal to enter a plea of guilty for a client who
protests innocence is anything but high-minded. Counsel, afraid the sentenced client will
petition for habeas corpus on the grounds the plea was coerced, is simply protecting himself.
80. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
81. Professor Alschuler casts considerable doubt on the strength of the facts against
Alford. See Alschuler, supra note 71, at 1291 n.300.
82. Professor Newman describes the Michigan procedure, which he calls "investigative
rather than diagnostic." The report usually contains a description of the offense and a statement as to whether the defendant "admits it," as well as a description of testimony of others
relating to the circumstances of the crime. The report may make a recommendation as to
guilt or innocence, as well as listing and describing any extenuating circumstances. One
report ended with the quaint conclusion: "By now the court has perused the report ....
[W]e believe any comment by us is superfluous other than to state that the defendant has, in
our opinion, violated the most important of the ten commandments, that of the seventh
commandment: 'Thou shalt not kill." NEwMAN, supranote 58, at 15.
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when appropriate standards are imposed. 83 Despite criticism that plea
bargaining results in sentences that are too lenient or, alternatively, too
harsh, we are assured that plea bargaining provides all things for all
performers: it is efficient, speedy, kindly to the defendant, considerate
of judicial sensitivity to society's necessities and discriminating in selecting, from the multitudes, cases that are deserving of jury trial.84
Although it is a rather ancient homily that confessions of guilt and
avowals of repentance are good for the soul,8 5 pleas of guilty resulting
from negotiated bargains, entered by reluctant defendants, induced by
eager lawyers, urged by overburdened prosecutors, and dignified by the
86
imprimatur of the court, may indeed be damaging to everyone's soul.
They do not encourage in the convicted a readiness to change their
criminal ways, but rather engender an attitude of cynicism. 8 7 They in-

volve the prosecutor and the judge in practices that may, at the least, be
characterized as questionable. Defense counsel is most deeply endangered, for she has relinquished a proper and honorable identity in order to perform in a drama where her role is most generously described
as equivocal.88
83. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (Tent. Draft 1967).
84. "For a defendant. . . his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin
immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State. . . the more

promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the
objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial
resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). In this writer's experience the
opposite is often true. If the prosecutor is very sure of the proof no bargain may be offered.
When no deal is offered the case goes to trial. When the prosecutor's demand is "plead as
charged" there is little risk attached to going to trial. This is called "taking the scenic route"
(to the state penitentiary).
85. Professor Weinreb points out: "The defendant's willingness to submit to judgment
is not the product of an impulse to mend his ways; it is based on a calculation that by so
doing he will reduce his punishment. . . . Contrition is beside the point." WEINREB, THE
DENIAL OF JUSTICE 80 (1977).
86. "[Tihe time for repentance comes after trial. The adversary process is a fact-finding engine, not a drama of contrition in which a prejudged defendant is expected to knit up
his lacerated bonds to society ....
. .. [W]ith the inducement of a lighter sentence dangled before him, the sincerity of
any cries of mea cu/pa becomes questionable." Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 270-71
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, J.).
87. In this writer's experience, even defendants who realize their own guilt experience
their punishment as the vindictive act of a hostile society. Defendants who think they have
been deprived of meaningful representation conclude they have been "bum rapped." See
NEWMAN, supra note 58, at 45.
88. Commenting on the relationship between the prosecutor and the defense counsel,
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The. . . value of counsel to the accused. . . does not lie in. . . [the]
ability to recite a list of possible defenses. . . nor. . . to amass a

large quantum of factual data and inform the defendant of it ....
Counsel's concern is the faithful representation of the interests
of his client and suchrepresentation frequently involves highly practical considerations as well as specialized knowledge of the law.
Often the interests of the accused are not advanced by challenges
that would only delay the inevitable date of prosecution. . . or by
contesting all guilt. . . . A prospect of plea bargaining, the expecta-

tion or hope of a lesser sentence, or the convincing nature of the evidence against the accused are considerations that might well suggest
the advisability of a guilty plea without elaborate consideration of
whether pleas in abatement.

. .

might be factually supported. 89

At the culminating moment, the plea bargaining process may have
deteriorated so thoroughly that it is difficult to determine who, among
the assembled participants, has been assigned which role. Indeed, a
stranger to the procedure may be unable to conclude who is offering
the plea and who is entering it, much less ponder the matter of voluntariness. Consider the following colloquy between judge, counsel and
defendant:
The Court: They tell me that this boy was caught by an off-duty
policeman. He has a long record.
Mr. George [Counsel]: That's right.
The Court: Do you realize the sentence you might have to face as a
second offender in a first-degree robbery? That is one of the reasons
I am talking to you now. I do not like to give long, long sentences.
Mr. George [Counsel]: I have advised him, Judge.
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Mr. George [Counsel]: 15 and 16 years as a firstThe Court: I advise you to think it over. If you are convicted, I might
have to send you away for the rest of your life. As I see it, the likelihood of your being acquitted is not too good. Of course, if you want
a trial, you will certainly get a fair trial. But you must remember
this: If you are convicted as a second offender of robbery in the first
degree, you will be entitled to no consideration of any kind from me.
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: On the other hand, a very, very fair plea is being offered
by the District Attorney. He is willing to give you that plea if you go
downstairs and tell the whole truth. [1] will give you every consideration if you are truthful. .

.

. Do you understand me?

The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: You have to make up your mind, son, now. Once you are
Edward Bennett Williams said, "[Tlhey begin to look like two wrestlers who"wrestle with
rTlhey do not want to hurt each
each other ... and in time get to be good friends ....
other too much. They just want to make a living." Interview with Edward Bennett Williams by Donald McDonald, in CENTER FOR THE STUDy OF DmocPRATIc INsUTIoNs,
INTERvIFws 10 (1962).
89. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1973).
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before the jury, you will be tried as indicted. You have a very able
counsel here, one of the best. I am not telling you what you should
do or what you should not do. I am merely pointing out to you what
you face.
The Defendant: Could you give me a chance to make up my mind?
The Court: I certainly will give you a chance to make up your mind,
but this case is ready today, son. Both the District Attorney and your
own lawyer have answered ready, and we are ready to proceed to
trial today. First of all, you have to make up your mind, asking
yourself, 'Did I do what is alleged in the indictment?' You and God
know the answer to that question. The District Attorney has told me
that, in his opinion, he has many witnesses who can prove his case.
You, yourself, know whether you did it or not. We are in chambers.
There is no jury here. I repeat that you will receive a fair trial. Or do
you want to take a plea to robbery in the second degree and have
some opportunity of receiving a shorter sentence? If I sentence you
after a conviction of robbery in the first degree, you are going to be
away until you are an old man. But I emphasize that I am not telling
you what to do, son.
Mr. George [Counsel]: I do not like to see a boy who is offered a plea
such as thisMr. George [Counsel]: Judge, I have worked before your Honor on
many occasions. I have been out here and I know the fairness of the
Court.
The Court: This boy has been a bad boy. There is no question about
that. From what I have heard about this case, this is a very serious
crime. The defendant must consider that in relation to his chances
which areMr. George [Counsel]: I know he hasn't any, Judge.
The Court: If he is convicted, I am faced with a mandatory firstdegree robbery as a second offender.
Mr. George [Counsel]: Your hands are tied. Your hands are tied at
15.
The Court: What do you want to do, son?
The Defendant: I will take it.
Mr. George [Counsel]: We will accept the plea.
The Court: Son, is this is what you want to do, when we return to the
courtroom and I question you concerning your plea, you must answer categorically. That means, when I ask you if you plead guilty,
you must say yes.
The Defendant: Yes. 90
90. United States v. La Vallee, 319 F.2d 308, 322-24 (2d Cir. 1963) (appendix to dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.).

On appeal, Judge Kaufman, who wrote the majority opinion, said, "We read the judge's
remarks not as an enticement or threat by means of a prior commitment by the judge to the
prisoner's sentence, but as merely a ... fair description ... which was manifestly essential

to an informed decision on the part of the prisoner." Id at 314.
Counsel and court may, indeed, be suspected of having learned their lesson from the
police manual: "Offer the suspect a solution ...that allows for cooperation and which can
be made to appear less objectionable to him than other courses of action that he might fol-
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Negotiations having been successfully concluded, the courtroom
encounter is routine. Counsel for defense announces that the defendant desires to withdraw the plea of not guilty previously entered and
enter a plea of guilty to certain of the charges. The prosecutor indicates
his approval and the defendant is voir dired.
"You understand that, by entering this plea, you are admitting every
element of the offense charged?"
"Furthermore, you are giving up your right to rely on your privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States?"
"You are pleading guilty because you are guilty and for no other
reason?"
"No promises or threats have been made to induce you to enter this
plea?"
"You are entering this plea freely, knowingly, understandingly and
voluntarily?"
Should the defendant, out of ignorance, petulance, mystification, or
anxiety, respond with the wrong answer, counsel has only to nudge him
into compliance.
Waiver
What is the significance of this scene, enacted as it is in any urban
area, simultaneously in three or four courtrooms on the appointed day,
repeated dozens of times by the -end of the day? Practical and moral
implications aside, interesting and conclusive legal consequences result.
By entering a guilty plea, the defendant, represented by counsel, has, in
the latest words of the Supreme Court of the United States participated
in an occasion that is for all practical purposes irreversible. 9' To answer the inquiry, "How do you plead?" with the word "Guilty!" terminates the right to claim any antecedent violations in the conduct of the
prosecution and, as well, precludes an examination into the voluntariness of the plea.
The triology that sanctified the guilty plea, Brady v. United
low. Makeyour solution appearattractiveby emphasizingthe disadvantagesor negative qualities of any otherpossible solution. Try to convince the subject that

He is confronted with a personal emergency.
Sincf he cannot escape, he must find a way out.
No available solution will be pleasant.
Your proposal should result in less unpleasantness than any of the other solutions."
ROYAL & ScHrrr, supra note 31, at 121.
91. See Toilett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790
(1970).
1.
2.
3.
4.
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States,92 McMann v. Richardson,93 and Parker v. North Carolina,94
held that rights recognized by the court subsequent to the time of the
guilty plea and retroactively applied have, nonetheless, been forever
lost to those convicted by plea. 95 The court appeared to honor the fifth
amendment imperative of conscious choice in its language of waiver.
In Brady,96 Justice White acknowledged that
a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care
and discernment ....

Central to the plea and the foundation for en-

tering judgment against the defendant is the defendant's admission
in open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment.
He thus stands as a witness against himself and he is shielded by the
Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do so-hence the minimum requirement that his plea be the voluntary expression of his
own choice. But the plea is more than an admission of past conduct;
it is the defendant's consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial-a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or
judge. Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary
awareness
but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
97
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
In other words, pleas of guilty are serious business and judgment
cannot be entered unless the defendant announces that he committed
the crime. If he makes that admission, the court acknowledges, he is,
indeed, testifying against himself and the fifth amendment will not permit compelled self-accusation. Therefore, the court cannot accept a
plea unless it is the result of an act of volition. Furthermore, the entry
92.
93.
94.

397 U.S. 742 (1970).
397 U.S. 759 (1970).
397 U.S. 790 (1970).

95. These rights have been called "present but unknowable rights." See note I ll infra.
96. In 1959, Brady entered a guilty plea to a violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act in
order to avoid risking the death penalty, had the jury so recommended. Subsequently, in
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968), the Supreme Court held that death penalty provision of the Act unconstitutional because the manner of the imposition of the penalty improperly penalized the assertion of a constitutional right. Brady challenged his
conviction on the grounds that the death penalty provision had functioned to coerce his plea.
The court was not persuaded, choosing to read the retroactive application of Jackson to
apply only to defendants convicted and sentenced to death after a jury trial. This led Justice
Brennan to the perception that "those who resisted the pressures identified in Jackson and
after a jury trial were sentenced to death receive relief, but those who succumbed to the same
pressures and were induced to surrender their constitutional rights are left without any remedy at all. Where the penalty scheme failed to produce its unconstitutional effect, the intended victim obtains relief; where it succeeded, the real victims have none. Thus the court
puts a premium on strength of will and invulnerability to pressure at the cost of constitutional rights." Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 807-08 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
97. 397 U.S. at 748.
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of the plea "waives" the right to trial and, for that reason, the defend-

ant must know what he is doing.
Did the defendant know what he was doing? Justice White did

not appear to be altogether comfortable with the conclusion that
Brady's plea should stand and finally resorted to the reassurance that
"his solemn admission of guilt was truthful."9 8

Brady, then, stands for the following: because a guilty plea must
be voluntary and intelligent in order to function as a waiver of the fifth

amendment, it will be deemed voluntary and intelligent so long as it
appears to be true. That is a proposition announcing a truly extraordinary reversal of the traditional equation that a confession is true because it is voluntary. 99
In McMann v. Richardson,10 the Supreme Court upheld the valid-

ity of guilty pleas resulting from confessions claimed to be coerced. It
conceded that a courtroom admission "must be an intelligent act' 0 '
and emphasized the useful function of counsel in rendering guilty pleas
immutable, but cautioned that the advice of counsel did not have to

"withstand retrospective examination."' 1 2 On the contrary, the defendant would be forever bound by the plea unless he could show "gross
98. Id at 758. "We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of
guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves." Id
99. In the traditional language coerced confessions are excluded because they are unreliable. See, eg., Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
100. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
101. Id at 766.
102. Id at 770. At the time the guilty pleas were entered in McMann, New York procedures permitted the judge to send the question of the voluntariness of confessions to the jury,
under an instruction that confessions determined to be involuntary were to be disregarded.
Subsequently, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), which was applied retroactively by
the McMann court, declared the New York approach to be constitutionally defective on the
ground that the defendant never received a clear-cut determination that the jury had found
his confession to be voluntary. Among their contentions, petitioners Dash, Richardson, and
Williams argued that the unconstitutional New York procedure had left them no viable
alternative to guilty pleas, and therefore the pleas were involuntary. Not so, concluded Justice White, reasoning that the decision to plead guilty when the State's case is weak and the
confession evidence strong, would depend on whether or not the defendant believed the
confession to be admissible. Pleading guilty, when the confession is evaluated as inadmissible, would seem a most improbable alternative and such a guilty plea could not, therefore,
be characterized as involuntary but simply a decision to bypass state remedies. On the other
hand, if the guilty plea is a consequence of the defendant's belief that the confession would
be admitted against him, it is an election of "the most advantageous course" and is, by the
very terminology, voluntary. A later assertion that "a coerced confession induced his plea is
at most a claim that the admissibility of the confession was mistakenly assessed." 397 U.S.
at 769.
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error"'103 on the part of counsel. Despite reassurances that
"[d]efendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and
that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance
by attorneys.

.

. ,"104 the Court found no merit in allegations that at-

torneys had ignored the issue of coerced confessions, neglected to explain the nature and consequences of the pleas, overlooked an alibi
defense, and misrepresented the seriousness of the charges. Rather, the
Court characterized such performance as "within the range of compe105
tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."'
One is moved to wonder what prompted such a seemingly casual
relaxation in standards.10 6 Surely the nature and character of the defendant's act in pleading guilty is not the crucial factor. Rather, the
Court admitted, "[w]hat is at stake.

.

.[is]

. .

.whether.

. .

defend-

ants must be permitted to withdraw their pleas, which were perfectly
valid when made, and be given another choice between admitting their
guilt and putting the State to its proof."' 1 7 Because there is "an inherent uncertainty in guilty-plea advice,"' 08 the Court found it possible to
justify its action on the grounds that a contrary result (to invalidate
pleas motivated by confessions) would be too drastic, "an improvident
invasion of the State's interests in maintaining the finality of guiltyplea convictions ..

."109 Finally, in Tollett v. Henderson,"0 the Court

acknowledged the foolishness of waiver language. The challenge involved the question of an unconstitutionally constituted grand jury, an
issue never suspected, much less recognized or explored by counsel.
Clearly, Henderson could not be described as having waived "a known
right or privilege""' of which he had never heard. Still emphasizing
103.

397 U.S. at 772.

104. Id at 771.
105. Id
106. Perhaps it is a concern that otherwise too many reversals would result: "I have
often been told that if my court were to reverse every case in which there was inadequate
counsel, we would have to send back half of the convictions in my jurisdiction." Bazelon,
The Defective Assistance of Counsel,42 U. CN. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1973).
107. 397 U.S. at 773.
108. Id at 774.
109. Id

110. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
111. Note, The Guilty Plea As 4 Waiver Of "PresentBut Unknowable" Constitutional
Rights: The Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1435, 1437 n.12 (1974) distinguished "present and knowable" rights, which apply to the defendant and exist at the
time the plea is entered, and rights that are "present but unknowable" in that they do not
apply to the defendant at the time the plea is entered, Ze., any right "announced by the
Supreme Court and given retroactive application." The first category includes the right
claimed in Tollett, the second, that claimed in the Brady triology. It is somewhat awkward
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the purifying properties of solemn courtroom admissions, the Court,
per Justice Rehnquist, now characterized the guilty plea as
a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal
process. When... a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in
open court 1 2 that he is, in fact, guilty of the offense with which he is
charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to
the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he
[the range of competence
received from counsel was not within. . .113
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.]
In other words, if a guilty plea is a "break" in "the chain of
events," it is itself an independent event that need no longer be characterized as an act of conscious self-determination having, as its consequences, the "waiver" of constitutional claims. In reality, the plea of
guilty functions as a foreclosure 14 of certain constitutional rights, foreclosure by operation of law. It should not be imagined that the unwitting defendant's knowledge, intelligence, and freedom to choose
to classify rights as "present" when they are not yet acknowledged by the Supreme Court of
the United States, even though subsequently they are retroactively applied.
112. If the defendant's solemn admission of factual guilt is the crucial imperative that
legitimizes the foreclosure of constitutional claims, that fact must be reconciled with an opposing principle: the constitutional requirement that the prosecutor prove legal guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. If we allow the distinction to be obliterated by a variety of in camera
justice that appears to bear a discomfitting resemblance to country justice or street justice, it
logically follows that the prosecutor's ability to sustain his burden becomes an accident of
circumstance, a mere irrelevance and, as a matter of fact, an impediment to the workings of
modern "justice." In that case, another high-minded principle will be sacrificed, perhaps
irretrievably. Consider the following story told by a senior trial attorney for a California
District Attorney's office: "The defendant was a bad actor. Defense counsel knew he was a
bad actor. He was charged with two counts of first degree burglary and there was another
case, of grand theft, coming up from downstairs. One witness couldn't be found, and the
other was afraid to testify and the third witness had been extradicted to Ohio on a felony
charge. We wanted him put away. Everyone wanted him put away. So we disposed of the
matter by dismissing the grand theft and reducing the burglary to second degree. He pled
guilty and we sent him across."
113. 411 U.S. at 267.
114. Professor Peter Westen, correctly perceiving that waiver has nothing to do with the
loss of constitutional defenses where the defendant's act is neither knowing, intelligent nor
voluntary, uses the language of forfeiture. "The significant difference between waiver and
forfeiture is that a defendant can forfeit his defenses without ever having made a deliberate,
informed decision to relinquish them, and without ever having been in a position to make a
cost-free decision to assert them. Unlike waiver, forfeiture occurs by operation of law without regard to the defendant's state of mind." Westen, Away From Waiver:A Rationaleforthe
Fo feiture of ConstitutionalR'ghts In CriminalProcedure,75 MICH L. REv. 1214, 1214 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Westen]. This conceptualization presents problems. The word forfeiture implies the imposition of a penalty for some form of conduct or, rather, misconduct.
Foreclosure simply means that an act has led to a consequence and is, I believe, the more
accurately descriptive term.
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justifies such a result when it is the predominant interest of the state in
the finality of convictions which is the ultimate, unrelenting, determinative factor.
It should not be imagined that the state's interest in the finality of

convictions is anything but legitimate. To allow convictions to remain
indefinitely vulnerable to challenge is expensive, inconvenient, oner-

ously burdensome to the prosecutor who may face trying a case that
can no longer be proved, and pervasively disturbing to the concept of
orderliness in the administration ofjustice."15 Although the notion that

the state's interest in the finality of convictions by plea is more substantial than its interest in conviction by trial is a questionable proposition,
there is merit in the idea that the peculiar imperatives of the negotiated
settlement justifies foreclosing certain, antecedent constitutional
claims.1 6 Nevertheless, as in other matters in which individual rights
are precluded by government's necessity, distinctions must be observed.
The guilty plea should not function to foreclose all claims of illegality
in the conduct of the prosecution, but only those that can be classified
as curable," 7 partial, or affecting the conduct of the prosecution. l1 8
Defects that are incurable, absolute or that affect the possibility of
trial" 9 should not be foreclosed. 20 While the event of a guilty plea
115. The concern writers on civil litigation have expressed in evaluating the opposing
goals of truth and fimality is better expressed, in criminal procedure, as a clash between
finality and justice. The trial of a defendant, after his conviction by plea has been reversed,
will end in one of two ways: with a conviction by verdict or an acquittal. One or the other of
these conclusions reflects the truth. The consequential matter is not the result of the trial but
its occurrence.
116. Professor Westen justifies his conclusion that the state "has a particularly great
interest in the finality of convictions based on guilty pleas" on the grounds that the state has
not prepared the case for trial nor preserved the evidence in an admissible form so that the
state may not be able to prove guilt should the plea be set aside. Westen, supra note 115, at
1235-36. It should be noted that the prosecution may no longer have an interest in bringing
the case to trial because the defendant has, very likely, served a substantial portion of the
sentence imposed before the plea was set aside.
117. Defenses that can be cured leave the state with the power to obtain a conviction,
Westen, supra note 114, at 1225, and are therefore partial defenses.
118. Traditional analysis classifies such defects as nonjurisdictional. Id. at 1231-32 n.36.
119. Defects that affect the possibility of trial go "to the very power of the State to bring
the defendant into court." Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974).
120. Another distinction exists between defects that relate to the issue of the defendant's
factual guilt and those that do not. In Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n.2 (1975),
the Court, analyzing the guilty plea trilogy, commented: "The point of these cases is that a
counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and
A guilty
intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case ....
plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically incon... In other words, defenses consissistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt.
tent with factual guilt can be foreclosed because the defendant's admission of guilt has
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would, for example, result in the loss of claims of illegal seizure or coerced confession,121 claims of double jeopardy,122 unconstitutionally
constituted grand jury,1 23 and unconstitutional statute ' 24 should
survive.
It would be foolhardy to imagine that this analysis disposes of the
matter. Indeed, the determination of which among the antecedent
claims have been foreclosed by the plea imposes the necessity of further
inquiry. Is there yet another, more immediate, consequence? Has the
rendered such claims irrelevant. Yet the Menna Court held that the defense of double jeopardy, which is consistent with factual guilt, survives the guilty plea. Professor Westen is
undoubtedly correct when he protests that: "Surely the Court meant 'consistent' rather than
'inconsistent.' After all, the basic theme of the footnote is that a plea of guilty operates as a
conclusive admission of factual guilt and, as such, renders moot or 'irrelevant' all constitutional violations that would otherwise tend to cast doubt on the defendant's factual guilt, Le.,
all constitutional violations that would otherwise conflict with the valid establishment of
factual guilt. Accordingly, one could say that a guilty plea renders irrelevant all constitutional violations that are 'not logically consistent' with the valid establishment of factual
guilt; or, alternatively, one could say that a guilty plea renders irrelevant all constitutional
violations that are 'logically inconsistent' with factual guilt; but it is a simple non sequitur to
say that a guilty plea renders irrelevant those violations that are 'not logically inconsistent'
with factual guilt. Consequently, one must assume that the Court stumbled over its use of
multiple negatives and actually meant the opposite of what it said." Westen, supra note 114,
at 1223 n.21. Professor Westen, however, believes that the Menna rationale should have
resulted in foreclosing the double-jeopardy claim because "the defense of double jeopardy is
designed in part to protect innocent defendants from being wrongly convicted by means of
successive prosecutions." Id at 1224. Presumably these claims are not logically consistent
with factual guilt.
121. This statement assumes that the state could proceed to trial without the tainted
evidence. If fourth and fifth amendment violations are curable, partial, affect only the conduct of the trial, and are therefore capable of foreclosure, they are totally consistent with
factual guilt. Analysis along these lines yields the opposite result.
122. In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974), the Court upheld Perry's "right
not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge. The very initiation of the proceedings against him in the Superior Court thus operated to deny him due process of law."
Although this result appears to be correct, Blackledge is clearly, as Mr. Justice Rehnquist
remarks, a double jeopardy decision. "[The decision] surely sounds in the language of
double jeopardy, however it may be dressed in due process garb." Id at 35 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
123. The holding of Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), that the claim of a
tainted indictment, tainted because it resulted from an unconstitutionally constituted grand
jury, had been foreclosed by a guilty plea is rationalized in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21,
30 (1974): "[E]ven a tainted indictment of the sort alleged in Tollett could have been 'cured'
through a new indictment by a properly selected grand jury." If that is, indeed, a possibility,
there is no reason to exclude unconstitutional statutes from the curative process. Where a
criminal prosecution is based on a statute later declared unconstitutional the legislature presumably has only to revise the statute so that the state may institute a new proceeding.
124. Prosecution under an unconstitutional statute cannot be waived by a guilty plea. It
is jurisdictional error and "affects the foundation of the whole proceedings. An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. . . . A conviction under it. . . is illegal and void
." Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879).
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privilege against self-incrimination been foreclosed, at the very moment the plea is entered, as well? The defendant, who may be altogether ignorant of the defects in the case against him, has accepted his
attorney's advice to plead guilty and is now engaged in the pretense
that a free, voluntary, intelligent, knowing, and understanding act of
deliberation is occurring. In the formula established by McMann .
Richardson,125 the mere presence of counsel not only allows the presumption of both advice and competence but also creates the illusion
that the plea is a conscious decision of the accused. Thus, counsel's
presence functions to insulate the plea from subsequent challenge.
That being the ineluctable result of the "effective representation of
counsel" on the occasion of the tendering of the plea of guilty, it should
cause no astonishment that defendants are finding they are less onerously burdened if they choose to represent themselves. 26
Proposal
It is not this writer's intention to announce that the system is bad
for us and, despairingly, quit the scene. I would rather, hope to suggest
solutions. There are, I think, three.
The most obvious is to abolish plea bargaining 27 and require that
the defendant go to trial or plead as charged, for a determinate sentence. There are benefits to such a procedure. Charging would more
realistically reflect the offense that had been committed, the defendant
would not be penalized for going to trial but could truly choose
"whether a trial is worth the agony and expense."' 28 The prediction
that the criminal justice system would be hopelessly clogged by an increase in the number of trials may or may not be accurate. In any case,
the abolition of plea bargaining is an unlikely event.
125. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
126. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). "[The representation of criminal
defendants becomes only another method of manipulating persons in situations where their
control over their lives is precisely what is at stake." Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 273
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice, in its Standard 3.1, recommended that: "As soon as possible, but in no event later than 1978, negotiations between
prosecutors and defendants--either personally or through their attorneys-concerning concessions to be made in return for guilty pleas should be prohibited. In the event that the
prosecution makes a recommendation as to sentence, it should not be affected by the willingness of the defendant to plead guilty to some or all of the offenses with which he is
charged. A plea of guilty should not be considered by the court in determining the sentence
to be imposed." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
AND GOALS 46 (1973).

128.

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
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The second possibility is to restore meaning to the language of
waiver, to assure that the accused's plea of guilty is, indeed, a free,
knowing, intelligent, conscious, and voluntary relinquishment of his
fifth amendment privilege not to incriminate himself. At the threshold,
the significance of factual guilt must be de-emphasized and the defendant must be assured that the subjective experience of guilt and its sup29
posedly purifying articulation is, legally and logically, immaterial.
The third possibility is total disclosure to the defendant of the specifics of his predicament, as well as the possibly effective alternatives to
the plea of guilty. This requirement calls for an imaginative and painstaking evaluation of the case by defense counsel, and that, in turn,
means thorough preparation for trial. The defendant must, as well, be
made aware of the significance of the concomitant rights being relinquished by the waiver of the fifth amendment privilege. 130 In addition,
all constitutional violations which may be foreclosed by the plea of
guilty, must be examined and, finally, the benefits conferred in exchange for the plea must be critically evaluated to determine whether
or not the defendant is, in fact,1 profiting by relieving the state of its
l3
burden of proving legal guilt.
The danger exists that the voir dire contrived to fulfill these imperatives could descend, articulated in the voices of the same tired performers; to the same meaningless litany criticized earlier in this Article.
Ultimately, that responsibility resides with the primary performer, defense counsel. That person must resolve to respect the legitimate inter129. It is the prosecutor's constitutional duty to prove legal guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, which is quite another matter. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975).
130. ZI, the right to trial by judge or jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58
(1968); the right to require the prosecutor to prove the defendant's guilt, of every element of
the offense, beyond a reasonable doubt; the right to confront one's accusers, Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
131. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West Supp. 1978). "[What is at stake for an
accused facing death demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable--canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of
what the plea connotes and of its consequences." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44
(1969).
The judge must be an active participant in the process. Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional
Rights: Disquietin the Citadel,84 HARv. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1970). "Throughout the process,
the defendant should be encouraged to ask questions in order to ensure that he understands

and ratifies his lawyer's decisions. If at any point it appears that the lawyer has not given
adequate consideration to a possible defense, or that he has not sufficiently demystified the
legal issues, the plea process should be terminated, subject to renewal, with the assurance
that all statements by the defendant are inadmissible in a subsequent trial. Similarly, if it
appears that an attorney has completely overborne the will of his client the process should
be halted." Id at 24.
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ests of the client and fully represent those interests. The interests of the
system are best represented by someone else.
No one could imagine that the revival of voluntary waiver would

be easy to accomplish, and, in reality, it may be, if not impossible, too
late. But all is not lost. There is still another alternative.
If we are not prepared to live by our stated principles, we must at
least cease the pretense, for it is this writer's belief that straightforward
expressions of candor are more sustaining to the soul than mendacious
protestations of culpability. Therefore, the best solution, one that is
simple and one that is true, is that we make the solemn admission in
open court that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is no longer honored in our courtrooms. If the defendant can be
persuaded to accuse himself, we will impose no impediment, in the

form of constitutional rights or any other technicality, to his solemn
admission, in open court, of guilt.
There is nothing disreputable or even vaguely new in following
such a procedure. 32 Scholars and writers have called for the abolition1 3 3 of the fifth amendment, condemning it as furthering a "'vague
sentimentality,' 1134 and serving the evil purposes of criminals and
malefactors.135 But outbursts of vituperation and proposals for amending the amendment 36 are unnecessary. All that is required is that we
132. See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow- The Case For Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 672-73 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Friendly].
133. Id at 672-73 n.7 (quoting Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L.
REV. 71, 87 (1891)).

134. See Friendly, supra note 132, at 647 (quoting McCormick, Some Problemsand Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEX. L. REv. 239, 277 (1946)).
135. Friendly, supra note 132, at 673 (citing Pound, Legal Interrogationof PersonsAccused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L.C.P.S. 1014, 1015 (1934)).
136. Judge Friendly has proposed the following amendment: "The clause of the fifth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 'nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself,' shall not be construed to prohibit: (1) Interrogating any
person or requesting him to furnish goods or chattels, including books, papers and other
writings, without warning that he is not obliged to comply, unless such person has been
taken into custody because of, or has been charged with, a crime to which the interrogation
or request relates. (2) Comment by the judge at any criminal trial on previous refusal by the
defendant to answer inquiries relevant to the crime before a grand jury or similar investigating body, or before a judicial officer charged with the duty of presiding over his interrogation, provided that he shall have been afforded the assistance of counsel when being so
questioned and shall have then been warned that he need not answer, that if he does answer,
his answer may be used against him in court; and that if he does not answer, the judge may
comment on his refusal. (3) Compulsory production, in response to reasonable subpoena or
similar process, of any goods or chattels, including books, papers and other writings. (4)
Dismissal, suspension or other discipline of any officer or employee of the United States, a
state, or any agency or subdivision thereof, or any person licensed by any of them, for refusal, after warning of the consequences, to answer a relevant question concerning his offi-
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cleanse the language of the voir dire so that it will function, simply, to
reveal what has really been happening all along:
You understand that your plea of guilty has a number of functions. You are acting as a witness against yourself. Although the
fifth amendment provides that no one can be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, this court is, indeed, compelmandate to
ling your guilty plea, thus, deeming the fifth amendment
137
be satisfied by your statement, 'I plead guilty.'
Furthermore, by your admission of guilt you have made a trial
unnecessary and, thus, relieved the state of the burden of proving
you guilty. In return, the state has conferred a benefit on you. That
benefit is represented by a reduction in the degree of the offence with
which you were charged and an assurance of a reduced sentence.
Finally, the state must, of course, promote its interest in the finality of your conviction and, therefore, this event is deemed to foreclose any claim you may subsequently wish to make that your plea of
guilty, entered on the record on this day in this courtroom, is not free
and voluntary.
Of course, caution is advised. We must be wary of the inevitable
consequences of such a step and be prepared to draw the appropriate
distinctions as they become necessary, if indeed it is our intention to
preserve the heart of the command that "no one shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Otherwise, we shall
survive to observe the prosecutor calling, as his next witness, the
defendant.
Said the Judge to Udall,
yourself to the Queen's mercy, before the
Confess. ..and submit
38
Jury find you guilty.'
cial or professional conduct in an investigation relating thereto, or the introduction in
evidence of any answer given to any such question, provided that such person shall have
been afforded the assistance of counsel. (5) Requiring a person lawfully arrested for or
charged with crime to identify himself and make himself available for visual and auditory
investigation and for reasonable scientific and medical tests, provided the assistance of
counsel has been afforded except when urgency otherwise requires. (6) Requiring registration or reporting reasonably necessary for a proper governmental purpose, provided that no
registration or report so compelled shall be admissible as evidence of any crime revealed
therein." Id at 721-22.
137. This is surely no sillier than mouthing the non sequitur that a guilty plea is voluntary because it is true.
138. Trial of Mr. John Udall, 32 Eliz. 1590, reprintedin 1 STATE TIALS 1271, 1282

(1590).

